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Abstract.
A Cyber Physical System (CPS) consists of cyber components for computation and communication, and physical components
such as sensors and actuators for process control. These components are networked and interact in a feedback loop. CPS
are found in critical infrastructure such as water distribution, power grid, and mass transportation. Often these systems are
vulnerable to attacks as the cyber components such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition workstations, Human Machine
Interface and Programmable Logic Controllers are potential targets for attackers. In this work, we report a study to investigate
the impact of cyber attacks on a water distribution (WADI) system. Attacks were designed to meet attacker objectives and
launched on WADI using a specially designed tool. This tool enables the launch of single and multi-point attacks where the
latter are designed to specifically hide one or more attacks. The outcome of the experiments led to a better understanding of
attack propagation and behavior of WADI in response to the attacks as well as to the design of an attack detection mechanism
for water distribution system.
Keywords: Industrial Control System, Cyber Attacks, Cyber-Physical Systems, SCADA Security, ICS Security, Water
Distribution Systems
1. Introduction
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are found in critical infrastructure such as water distribution, energy
and transportation. CPS consists of a physical process controlled by an Industrial Control System (ICS).
In a CPS, a set of sensors measure process variables such as temperature, flow rate, level etc., from the
physical process and send these values to the controllers through communication channels. Based on
these values the controller makes decisions and initiates actions on the physical process. Figure 1 shows
the representation of a CPS as a feedback system [1].
Attacks on ICS can have a significant impact depending on the type of attack and its location. The
increase in successful cyber attacks on ICS [2, 3], and many unsuccessful attempts [4], points to the
importance of research in the design of ICS that is resilient to cyber attacks. Attacks are a result of ex-
ploitation of one or more vulnerabilities in an ICS. Such vulnerabilities might be due to the lack of access
control in the system [5], software vulnerabilities in the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Super-
visory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) software systems, and weaknesses in the communication
channels.
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Fig. 1. Key components in a CPS. State transformation of a CPS in a feedback control loop.
Motivation: Several attacks on water distribution systems have been reported in recent years such as
the Kemuri Water Company (KWC)1 attack, in 2016. The attack resulted in the exposure of personal
information of the utility’s 2.5 million customers. Reports from ICS-CERT [6] indicate that an under-
standing of these attacks against critical infrastructure is important for rapid investigation and evaluation
of detection methods. The work presented in this paper is a step towards realizing a safe and secure
water distribution infrastructure. To create effective protection methods that lead to low false alarm and
high detection rates, one needs to understand the nature of attacks on water distribution systems and the
system response.
Goals and research questions: The goal of the study reported here is to (a) understand vulnerabilities and
design potential attacks and (b) investigate the impact of cyber physical attacks. The following questions
are addressed through experimentation on WADI: RQ1: How do cyber attacks impact a water distribu-
tion system? RQ2: How does knowledge of the response of a water distribution system to one or more
cyber attacks help in designing an attack detection mechanism?
Contributions: In the context of a specific water distribution plant: (a) A tool to launch attacks and
(b) design and implementation of attacks on a water distribution system.
Organization: The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Background and preliminary works
are explained in Section 2. Section 3 presents the context of this work and includes architecture of WADI,
vulnerability assessment, and how attacks can be launched on WADI. Section 4 describes the attack
design and investigation on WADI. Response to the research questions and lessons learned are discussed
in Section 5. Related work is presented in Section 6. Section 7 offers a summary of this work and future
work.
2. Preliminaries and background
This section provides information needed to understand the remaining paper.
2.1. Industrial Control Systems
ICSs are found in plants such as water treatment, distribution, and in power generation, transmission
and distribution. The complexity of an ICS increases the attack surface for an attacker to launch attacks
1http://www.securityweek.com/attackers-alter-water-treatment-systems-utility-hack-report
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the control portion of a CPS. P1, P2,. . . ,Pn denote PLCs. Each PLC communicates with
its sensors and actuators through a local network at Level 0. PLCs communicate among themselves via another
network at Level 1. Communication with SCADA and other computers is not shown here.
both at the cyber-and the physical-parts of a plant. Control software in an ICS may also contain vulner-
abilities for reasons such as un-patched or practically impossible to patch legacy code, the absence of
standard security certifications for ICS devices, and the lack of resources to keep the ICS updated.
Communication Structure of ICS: ICS consist of distributed supervisory control systems. The control
system itself is a collection of PLCs, each controlling a specific portion of the physical process. Each
PLC communicates with a set of sensors and actuators via a local network (Figure 2) through a multi-
layer network also referred to as the field-bus network [7]. The PLCs communicate with each other using
the Level 1 network. Such a layered network is in accordance with the prevailing practice for ICS [8]. As
mentioned in Section 1, attacks on ICS are on the rise. The results of a recent survey [9] show on threat
landscape on ICS in September 2017. It represents the attack space and how often an attacker attempts
to enter an ICS. Such attempts, often successful, motivate the study reported here.
SCADA and Distributed Control Systems are referred as to as operational Technology (OT). The
convergence of Information Technology (IT) and OT [10] is increasing in water distribution systems.
With this convergence, OT data is now accessible from IT environment such as via remote access. The
OT data includes critical information regarding the plant such as temperatures, level indicators, control
signals, sensor signals and actuator statuses; especially so in water distribution systems as they are
distributed across a city making it an easy target for cyber-physical attacks.
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2.2. Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability assessment on ICSs follows four main steps2: 1) identify list of assets and resources in
the system, 2) assign importance to the resources, 3) identify security vulnerabilities in each asset and
resource, 4) propose mitigation for the most serious vulnerabilities.
In order to know all the vulnerabilities in ICS, one must know the associated paths within ICS commu-
nications. In [11] authors explained different paths through which an attacker can enter into the system
using various devices, communications paths, and methods that can be used for communicating with
process system components. An attacker who wishes to attack ICS has to go through the following
steps: 1) gain access to the ICS network 2) perform reconnaissance and understanding of the process
3) gain control of ICSs.
Some of the industries conducted the vulnerability assessments in industrial systems and published the
results. Following are the summary of reports from Kasper-sky and Honywell. Kasper-sky [12] summa-
rized the findings of it’s research on ICS vulnerabilities as follows: Over the years, 19 vulnerabilities in
2010 increased to 189 vulnerabilities in 2015. Even though the vulnerabilities are fixed by the product
manufactures, the ICS management not upgrading soon. At least 5% of the vulnerabilities published by
ICS-CERT were not fully fixed. Sometimes the vulnerable component was removed from the market
and vendor support may not be available anymore. Honeywell XL Web II Controller Vulnerabilities [13]
are found by an independent researcher. An attacker may use these to expose a password by accessing a
specific URL. The XL Web II becomes an entry point into the network.
Fig. 3. Three stages in WADI are shown. Solid arrows indicate flow of water and sequence of processes. S: set
of sensors; A: set of actuators. LT-Level Transmitter, AIT-Analyzer Indication Transmitter, FIT-Flow Indication
Transmitter, PIT-Pressure Indication Transmitter, LS-Level Switch. Actuators: P-Pump, MV-Motorized valve,
MCV-Modulating Control Valve, SV-Solenoid Valve. Tag name of the instrument is indicated as XXX_YYY_ZZZ,
where XXX, YYY and ZZZ represent stage number, instrument type and instrument index, respectively.
2https://www.secureworks.com/blog/vulnerability-assessments-versus-penetration-tests
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3. Context: WADI Testbed
This study centers around a Water Distribution (WADI) testbed3. This section covers the testbed ar-
chitecture and the communication channels.
3.1. Architecture of the WADI
Water distribution (WADI) plant [14] is an operational testbed supplying 10 US gallons/min of filtered
water. It represents a scaled-down version of a large water distribution network in a city. WADI consists
of three stages (Figure 3), namely primary grid (P1), secondary grid (P2), and return water grid (P3).
Primary grid consists of two raw water (RW) tanks of 2500 liters each. These tanks are fed by three
incoming sources including Public Utility Board (PUB), return water grid, and from a water treatment
plant. A level sensor (1_LT_001) is installed in the primary grid to monitor the levels in the RW tanks.
Water quality analyzers are installed to measure pH, turbidity, conductivity and residual chlorine. Sec-
ondary grid consists of two Elevated Reservoir (ER) tanks, consumer tanks, and contamination sampling
stations. RW tanks supply water to the ER tanks using raw water pump (1_P_003) which is installed in
the primary grid. Two level sensors, 2_LT_001 and 2_LT_002 are installed in ER tanks to measure water
levels. Further, water from ER tanks flows into the consumer tank based on the preset demand pattern.
Two water quality monitoring stations are installed at consumer tanks. One station is at the immediate
downstream of reservoir and another is before the consumer tanks (P2A and P2B stations in Figure 3).
These stations ensure water quality before it is sent to the consumer tanks. Once a consumer tank is
filled, a level switch installed raises an alarm and water from the tank drains into the return water grid.
To recycle water, return water grid pumps water to the primary grid. Water quality analyzers are installed
in return water grid to check water quality before pumping it into the primary grid.
Three PLCs are installed to control each stage of WADI. These PLCs use CompactRIO as RIO (Re-
mote Input Output) from National Instruments. In addition to the PLC in the secondary grid, two Schnei-
der Electric Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), which use SCADAPack, are installed to measure water
quality. There is a total of 103 sensors and actuators operating to measure water levels, water quality,
flow rates, pressure, and status of motorized valves and pumps. There are three levels of networks in
WADI. Level 0 corresponds to the communication between PLC’s and sensors over Modbus RS485.
Level 1 corresponds to communications using the National Instrument’s publish subscribe protocol (NI-
PSP) while the SCADAPack RTUs communicate through Modbus TCP. PLCs at Stage-1 and Stage-3
are connected to analyzers capable of communicating through Modbus Serial. Level 2 consists of com-
munication between the HMI and the plant control network. The interconnection of HMI, workstations
and PLCs allows remote monitoring.
3.2. Vulnerability Assessment in WADI
To identify vulnerabilities in an ICS, one must know the associated paths within its communication
infrastructure. In [11] authors explained paths through which an attacker can enter the system using
various devices, communications paths, and methods that can be used for communicating with process
system components.
List of assets and resources in the system: The list of assets are mentioned in the Table 1. In this sub-
section, different vulnerabilities in the WADI are explained based on the assets provided from Table 1.
3https://itrust.sutd.edu.sg/research/testbeds/water-distribution-wadi/
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These includes Eternal Blue, default admin password on web server, and vulnerabilities in restful web
service, Modbus serial and TCP, objective C program that speaks NI-PSP and custom VI that interacts
with a python script.
Table 1
Assets Table
Asset Version/Model used Location
SCADA System SCADA System from Lab-
view is used for the applica-
tion.
SCADA System computer running on Windows 7.
PLCs NI PLC is used in WADI to
control various operations
Control and network panel and works based on the
firmware and control logic program. Communicates with
NI-PSP and Modbus TCP/IP communication in few
cases
Network Switches Moxa ES5 301 Network Control panel
Access points Wifi access points Network Control panel
Eternal Blue: [15, 16] This is an exploit that focuses on Microsoft Windows and used for the wannacry
ransomware attack in 2017. EternalBlue [17] is vulnerability in server message block (SMB) protocol.
This is mentioned in CVE-2017-0144 [18] catalog. SMB server mishandles the packets from remote
attackers, which eventually allows to access to the system. Attacks similar to wannacry attack was stud-
ied in automotive sector [19] and identified as an emerging threat to critical infrastructure and industrial
control systems.
Default Admin Password on webserver:[6, 11, 20] Manufacturures follow default passwords, and during
the installation and configuration period, the operating management are not changing the default pass-
words. Attacker can use those default passwords from each manufacturing unit and exploit the system.
Later it could be used to modify the functions of the overall control the system.
To develop the attack tool all communication channels were studied and investigated for openings and
vulnerabilities. A lot of them lacked any form of access control. Different parts of WADI support various
different communication channels like MODBUS between RTUs and SCADA, NI-PSP between various
controllers and RTUs.
Restful Web Service: LabVIEW allows VIs to be equipped with restful web services which manipulates
the data via HTTP methods like GET, POST etc. These services don’t require any authentication by
default.
Modbus Serial And TCP: RTUs P2A and P2B run Modbus TCP while the analyzers installed in P1 and
P3 are connected via Modbus serial. The protocol was designed with safety in mind but not security
and hence lacks any type of access control, if you can ping a device running Modbus you can own the
device. Python has a couple of libraries which speak Modbus, most importantly pyModbus. Using this
library an attack tool was designed capable of reading and manipulating data on 8 sensors connected in
P2A and P2B related to water quality. These sensors are responsible for measuring the water properties
such as pH, ORP, conductivity.
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Objective C Program that Speaks NI-PSP: It was found that there exist C# and Visual Basic libraries
that speak NI-PSP. These libraries are proprietary and consist of Measurement Studio for Visual Studio.
This allows any attacker to write and read basic data from sensors and actuators in the plant.
Custom VI that interacts with a python script: This method relies on using special VIs (Virtual Instru-
ments) or LabVIEW programs that can read and write to the cluster variables. To make this method more
dynamic, a python package was written that could speak to the Virtual Instruments to craft more com-
plex attacks giving complete access to the system. The NI-PSP implementation in the water distribution
system plant has no authentication or access control as mentioned above. As long as an adversary can
access the network they can control the entire plant.
Summary: All the above methods rely on the fact that the network is very open. The system has no
authentication in place and depends on the network to be full of good nodes acting in the interest of the
plant.
• The National Instruments Publish Subscribe Protocol variables have a property through which they
can be made accessible to certain users/groups through an additional plugin but the configuration of
the plant allows access to any user on any host as long as they can connect with the PLC/SCADA
system. The publish subscribe protocol has no security for variables by default. One has to pay for
another product called DSC or Datalogging and Supervisory Control to have any form of security.
• Modbus is known to be very open and insecure. As long as one can assume the IP address of one
of the registered devices in the network, one can access, read and write any variable on any register
via Modbus. Assuming IP address is as simple as removing one of the cables from one of the
switches and plugging in your own cable. Despite the lack of any access control methods, MODBUS
finds itself being continously used in a lot of Industrial Control Systems. It has no passwords, no
authorization, no facility to pass certificates but it continues to be used because of it’s popularity
and simplicity. Having a firewall in place is one of the methods to ensure that a PLC isn’t exposed to
the internet but this doesn’t solve the inherent problems that MODBUS brings, it only pushes it up a
level. Now the attacker has to access a machine that the firewall trusts in order to gain access to the
PLC supporting MODBUS. According to the Internet of Things Search Engine Shodan, there are
17,000 devices listening to MODBUS on the internet majority of them being in the united states. 4
CWE-2845 Improper Access Control talks about systems with improper or no access control. The state
of the plant at the moment exhibits CWE-284. As an adversary can easily read and manipulate critical
data in the plant the plant at the moment is also guilty of having the CWE-306: Missing Authentication
for Critical Function weakness.
Moving forward protocol designers and software/PLC component manufacturers should push for
proper authentication by default. The lack of secure defaults is no minor issue and is nothing new. A
lot of studies have shown the impact of insecure defaults and how users generally don’t change6’7 the
defaults if they don’t have to.
4 https://blog.shodan.io/content/images/2015/09/screenshot-www-shodan-io-2015-09-04-22-33-29.png
5https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
6https://www.uie.com/brainsparks/2011/09/14/do-users-change-their-settings/
7https://www.nngroup.com/articles/the-power-of-defaults/
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3.3. Attacking WADI
As mentioned in Section 3.1, WADI uses a multi layered network comprising of different protocols at different
levels and between different devices. For this paper the focus is on the National Instruments Publish Subscribe
Protocol (NI-PSP). NI-PSP is the most used protocol in the entire WADI network and provides access to all data
on the network. We developed an attack tool named NiSploit8 that uses custom LabVIEW Virtual Instruments
(VIs) that communicate with shared variables present on different PLCs across the plant using NI-PSP. Earlier
exploration into various other mechanisms gave limited access to the variables [5].
Shared variables are used by a controller and SCADA to expose data over the network via a shared variable
engine. These variables reside in controllers and the SCADA, have publish-subscribe architecture, and are shared
using the NI-PSP. Network shared variables publish data through the shared variable engine. The shared variable
engine resides on a SCADA and manages variables using the NI-PSP protocol. In the publish subscribe model the
publishers do not publish to clients; instead they send data to the shared variable engine after every update and the
subscribers subscribe to the shared variable engine for changes.
LabVIEW programs, or VIs, are simple drag and drop programs. We have written custom VIs for the purpose
of attacking the National Instruments Publish Subscribe Protocol Variables. Several different custom VIs have
been created, each one for attacking different types of cluster variables used in WADI. The Python module is the
front end of the tool and an attacker needs to be concerned only with the use of this module. The module uses
ActiveX [21] to control the LabVIEW application from python code. It connects to ActiveX controls using the
Pywin32 library. ActiveX allows the user to run programs and specific functions that the program has exposed via
it’s ActiveX server. LabVIEW exposes a lot of different functionality including the ability to run VIs, set values for
different controls and to fetch values of interest. The custom VIs along with the python module allow for creating
powerful and complex controlled attacks. The attacks designed and executed in the following Section (Section 4)
are realized through the NI-PSP attack tool called NiSploit.
4. Attack Investigation on WADI
This section presents a detailed case study which includes attack design, execution of attacks and results. We
assumed an attacker [22] has an ability to enter into the system through vulnerabilities and social engineering.
Further, we considered an insider attacker profile in which attacker has the process, communication knowledge,
and access to the communication channels.
4.1. Attack Design
Attacks considered in this paper are launched on primary grid (P1) and secondary grid (P2) of WADI (Sec-
tion 3.1). Stage-1 contains a tank whose level is measured by 1_LT_001. The stage-2 tank is responsible for water
received by the consumer and its level is measured by 2_LT_002. Valve 1_MV_001 is responsible for the flow of
water from RW tanks to the drain. Valve 1_MV_002 is responsible for the inflow of water to the RW tank. Valve
2_MV_003 is responsible for inflow of water to the ER tank. Water flows from the RW tank to the ER tank. In this
study, an attacker is an insider, who has an access to the system: process, communication knowledge, and access
to the communication channels.
Cyber attacks on WADI were derived from a CPS-specific generalized attacker model[23, 24]. This model
contains the attacker’s intents (set I), and the attack domain (D). For example, in a water distribution system
attacker’s intent could be water pump damage or overflow the water from a tank. An attack model for a CPS is
represented as a six-tuple (M,G,D, P, S o, S e). An attack procedure M is designed by the attacker to realize an
attack on a finite set of attack points P in a CPS when this CPS is in state S o, and possibly removed when the
8https://gitlab.com/gyani/NiSploit
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CPS is in state S e. This attacker model is useful in generating a variety of attacks. Attack procedure M contains
the attack vectors which include how an attacker enters into the system and manipulate different communication
channels. The procedure M essentially the use of the NiSploit tool as described in Section 3.3. Goal G is equal
to Intent I. Domain D is derived from the CPS domain [23]. For each CPS, domain is different based on the kind
of physical process and components involved. Here, P is a set of sensors, actuators or any other potential attack
points. S o is the starting state of the system at the time of attack launch starting and S e is the end state of the
system when the attacker ends an attack. When S e and I is identical then it shows that attacker reached his intent
or attacker made an impact on the system.
Impact of attacks can be viewed along three [23] dimensions: (Cm, Pr, Pe), where Cm represents the impact on
components of the system, Pr is the impact on properties such as water pH, ORP (Oxidation Reduction Potential),
conductivity and hardness, Pe is performance of the overall plant - e.g. if a water distribution system supplies
10 million gallons per day, attacker intent may be to reduce it to 5-million gallons per day. The attacks are on
1_LT_001, 2_LT_002, 1_MV_002, 2_MV_003, and 1_MV_001 which form the Cm dimension of the attack do-
main. For the dimensions considered in this paper, refer to Table 2. The attacks also affect the flow of water that
falls along the Pe dimension. Pr is an empty set as the attacks do not affect the property dimension. Based on the
above description, six attacks were designed and launched one at a time (refer to the Table 2 for summary of all
attacks).
As we discussed in the attacker model, we derived the attacks from an intent of the attack. Based on the existing
realistic attacks and incidents reported in the literature on water distribution systems, we considered the following
intents in our experiments: 1) stop water supply to consumers, 2) damage water pumps in water distribution system,
3) overflow the water tanks, 4) wastage of water by leaking the pipe, 5) burst the water pipes, 6)manipulate the
dosing mechanisms in a water distribution systems.
One might attempt to realize only one or more than one intent (mentioned in Table 2) at a time. There are a couple
of steps in going through to realize an intent: 1) understand the physical process, 2) based on the intent, identify
the set of sensors or actuators to manipulate, and 3) control process to reach the intent. Initially, we understand
the WADI process behavior and identify the set of sensors and actuators to be attacked in order to reach the intent.
We divided the attacks into two categories based on the number of sensors and actuators attacked. A single-point
attack is when only one sensor or actuator is attacked. When the attack occurs on more than one sensor or actuator,
it is classified as a multi-point attack. In Table 2, four single point and two multi point attacks are listed.
4.2. Execution of attacks
We used the NiSpliot (see Section 3.3) to launch the attacks listed in Table 2. The remaining subsection offers
details of each attack.
4.2.1. Attack 1: Attack on 1_LT_001
This is an attack on level indicator 1_LT_001. This level indicator measures the level in the raw water tank (stage
1). The related shared variable is stored at the path P1-CompactRIO/HMI_HOST/HMI_1_LT_001 and contains
measurements for the water level in raw water tank 1. The shared variable cluster can be broken further into the
following variables.
• PV - Process value measures water level.
• SIM PV - Process value used in simulation Mode.
• SIMULATION - This variable is a boolean, sets whether the PV is to be used in the simulation PV or the
actual PV.
• SAHH - Set point Alarm High High, the HH alarm default is 90.
• SAH - Set point Alarm High, the High (H) alarm set point default is 70.
• SAL - Set point Alarm Low, the Low (L) alarm set point default is 60.
• SALL - Set point Alarm Low Lo (LL), the Low Low alarm set point default is 40.
• S EMPTY - Set point for the state in which the tank is considered empty, default is 35.
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Table 2
Summary of attacks launched on WADI
Attack
No
Attack Sen-
sor/Actuator
Intent Start
state(S o)
End
state(S e)
Single Point Attacks
1 LIT -
1_LT_001
Block flow of water to ER
tank
48% 40%
2 LIT -
2_LT_002
Stop flow of water to con-
sumers and damage pump
80%
3 MV -
1_MV_002
No flow of water to the
consumers
Open Close
4 MV -
1_MV_001
Block flow of water to raw
water tank
Open Close
Multi Point Attacks
5 1_AIT_002,
2_MV003
Supply contaminated water
to the elevator tank
1_AIT_002
is 0.5 and
2_MV003 is
Close
1_AIT_002
is 6 and
2_MV003 is
Open
6 2_MCV_101,
2_MCV_201
Intermittent supply to con-
sumer tank
Both Close Open both
valves at
50%
• A EMPTY - Alarm indicating S EMPTY is reached.
• AHH - Alarm indicating SAHH is reached
• AH - Alarm indicating SAH has been reached.
• AL - Alarm indicating SAL is reached.
• ALL - Alarm indicating SALL is reached.
In this attack the attacker sets SIMULATION to True and also sets Simulation PV to 40 while setting
S_EMPTY to 40 using a script written using the NiSploit library. Thus, the state of WADI moves from
S o={SIMULATION=False, S EMPTY=35, 2_MV_004=Open} to S e={SIMULATION=True, S EMPTY=40,
2_MV_004=Close}.
4.2.2. Attack 2: Attack on 2_LT_002
This is an attack on level indicator 2_LT_002. This level indicator measures ER tank-2 level in process 2. The
related shared variable is stored at the path P2-CompactRIO/HMI_HOST/HMI_2_LT_002 and contains measure-
ments for the water level in ER tank-2. The shared variable cluster can be broken further into smaller variables
as described in Section 4.2.1. In this attack the attacker sets PV to 80 by running a continuous loop. The state of
valves and pumps remains unchanged, i.e. open and running, but the level of water falls in both the Raw Water
Tank and the ER.
4.2.3. Attack 3: Attack on Motorized Valve 1_MV_002
This attack is on motorized valve 1_MV_002. This motorized valve is an actuator in process 1, the related shared
variable is stored at the path P1-CompactRIO/HMI_HOST/HMI_1_MV_002 and contains the current status of the
respective motorized valve governing the flow of water to the drain.
The shared variable cluster can be broken further into smaller variables. The state of the system moves from
S o={1_MV_002=Close, 2_MV_004=Open} to S e={1_MV_002=Open, 2_MV_004=Close}.
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Fig. 4. Attack 1: Water level readings of three stages.
Attacker brings the level of 1_LT_001 to 40%.
Fig. 5. Attack 1: Flow to the consumer tanks and con-
sumers are cut-off from water supply from little over
3500 seconds onwards.
• Auto - If set to True, the motorized valve works according to the programmed logic.
• Open Command - open the valve
• Close Command - close the valve
• Reset - reset valve state to default state
• Available - Check if the Valve is available for control.
• Fully Open - Boolean indicating whether the Valve is fully open.
• Fully Close - Boolean indicating whether the valve is fully closed.
• Failed to Open - When the open command is sent but the valve could not be opened.
• Failed to Close - When the close command is sent and the valve could not be be closed.
• Status - The current status of the valve.
• State - The current state of the valve, i.e. open or closed.
The attacker sets Auto to False and force opens the drain valve.
4.2.4. Attack 4: Attack on Motorized Valve 1_MV_001
This attack is on motorized valve 1_MV_001. This motorized valve is an actuator in process 1. The related
shared variable is stored at the path P1-CompactRIO/HMI_HOST/HMI_1_MV_001 and contains the current sta-
tus of the motorized valve governing the inflow of water to raw water tanks. The attacker sets Auto to False
and sends the Close command. The state of WADI moves from S o={1_MV_001=Open, 2_MV_004=Open} to
S e={1_MV_001=Close, 2_MV_004=Close}.
In the previous sections, we described the single point of attacks. It is also possible an attacker can target multi
points at a time, within the single stage and/or across multiple stages. However, in this study we investigated attacks
on maximum two points. As shown in the Table 2, four two point attacks are launched on the system.
In attack 5, the attacker intention is to supply contaminated water to the elevator tank. In order to realize this
intent attacker targets multistage multi point attack across the processes P1 and P2. In this attack, attacker targets
1_AIT_002 in process1 and 2_MV002 in process2. In attack 6, the attacker intention is to cause intermittent supply
to consumer tank. This is an single stage multi point attack, where attacker targeted two actuators (2_MCV_101,
2_MCV_201 ) in process P2. Initial and final states of the system during attack 5 and attack 6 are mentioned in
Table 2.
4.3. Results
The results show how an attacker is able to reach his intent. This kind of study is helpful to perform the impact
analysis of the system. The remaining subsection presents the results for the attacks designed in the Table 2.
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4.3.1. Attack 1: Attack on 1_LT_001
From Figure 4 it can be seen that the attack begins slightly after 1000 seconds when the 1_LT_001 is set to
simulation mode with SIM PV at 40. Figure 4 shows the attack on 1_LT_001 in which the attacker alters the
reading from 48% to 40% of the RW tank level which corresponds to a LowLow (LL) state. Since the raw water
tank is in LL state the controller sends a command to open the PUB inlet valve, or the return water grid pump, to
fill the tank. Further, due to LL state of the RW tank there is no flow of water from primary to the secondary grid.
It is to be noted that at the time of attack launch on RW tank, the secondary grid is at 50% of the maximum tank
level. Therefore, the secondary grid supplies water to the consumer tanks until it reaches to 35% of the maximum
tank level which is considered an “Empty" state. The secondary grid tank level (2_LT_002) behavior is shown in
Figure 4. Figure 5 indicates that no water flows to the consumers when the secondary grid tank is in Empty state.
Further, the RW tank overflows as there is no flow from the primary grid to the secondary grid though there is
continuous supply of water to RW tank through the PUB valve.
Fig. 6. Attack 1: Actual level of the RW tank as it overflows.
It is possible to estimate from first principles the water level in a tank. Mass balance equations, in continuous and
discrete forms, for the change in water level h for a given input Qin and output Qout, flow rate, as follows,
A
dh
dt
= Qin − Qout, (1)
h(t + 1) = h(t) +
∆t(Qin(t)− Qout(t))
A
, (2)
where A is the cross sectional area of the tank. Assuming linear dynamics, Qin and Qout are either 0 (when valve
closes) or constant (when valve opens). We use Eq 2 to estimate the tank level when a sensor is under attack. In
this attack, the attacker sets the value of 1_LT_001 to 40% which corresponds to LL state. Consequently the outlet
flow rate Qout is zero. Hence, Eq 2 reduces to the following
h(t + 1) = h(t) +
∆t(Qin(t))
A
. (3)
Using Eq. 3 we estimate the actual level of the tank. As in Figure 6 the tank overflows when the attacker sets a
constant value to 40%.
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4.3.2. Attack 2: Attack on 2_LT_002
Fig. 7. Attack 2: Water level readings of tanks. Figure shows launch of attack on 2_LT_002 at approximately 1000
seconds.
In Figure 7 it can be seen that the attack begins after 1000 seconds when 2_LT_002 is set to 80% of the tank
level which corresponds to High (H) state. This leads to no flow of water from the RW tank to ER tank. However,
the ER tank continuously supplies water to the consumers. After sufficient time has elapsed, the actual ER tank
level moves to Empty state as seen in Figure 8. It can be observed that in this situation the booster pump will be
running continuously assuming that ER level is at H. Consequently the booster pump will run dry and may be
damaged unless a physical protection, e.g., a temperature cut off, are installed. Further, supply to the consumers
stops completely.
4.3.3. Attack 3: Attack on Motorized Valve 1_MV_002
In Figure 9 it can be seen that the attack begins after 1000 seconds when valves 1_MV_002 and 1_MV_003
(also called drain valves) are forced open. When these valves are open, water starts draining from the RW tank.
Also, water is supplied to the ER tank when its level reaches the L state. After some time water level in the RW
tank reaches to LL state and consequently PUB inlet valve, or return water grid pump, turns on to fill the tank. Note
that water filling (through the PUB valve or return water grid) and draining (through 1_MV_002 and 1_MV_003)
happens simultaneously. This leads to the water level in the tank at 40% or below depending on the inlet and drain
water flow rate. Figure 10 shows that water level falls below 40% gradually leading to no water supply from RW
tank to the ER tank. Consequently water supply will be stopped to the consumer tanks (shown in Figure 11) when
the level in the ER tank falls to 35% of the maximum tank level.
4.3.4. Attack 4: Attack on Motorized Valve 1_MV_001
As in Figure 12 the attack begins after 1000 seconds when 1_MV_001 valve is forced shut. This leads to no
water flow into the RW tank. Figure 13 shows that RW tank level is kept at 40% as a result of the attack. Hence,
there is no flow from the RW to the ER tank. However, the ER tank continuously supplies water to the consumers.
14 Adepu et al. / Investigation of cyber attacks ICS: WADI
Fig. 8. Attack 2: Actual water level of ER tank (2_LT_002) goes into Empty state.
Fig. 9. Attack 3: Attack on valves 1_MV_002 and 1_MV_003.
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Fig. 10. Attack 3: Water tank levels of 1_LT_001 reduces gradually. At ≈ 2250 s 2_LT_002 reaches to Empty state
(35% of tank level).
Fig. 11. Attack 3: Water flow to the consumers.
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Fig. 12. Attack 4: Attack on valve 1_MV_001 at approximately 1250 seconds
Fig. 13. Attack 4: Water tank levels when 1_MV_001 is attacked.
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It can be observed from Figure 13 that ER tank level reaches Empty state after sometime and there is no water
flowing to the consumers.
4.4. Multi point attacks
4.4.1. Attack 5
In this attack, attacker launches multi point attack on 1_AIT_001 and 2_MV_003 as shown in Figure 14 and 15
respectively. Initially, the attacker manipulates 1_AIT_001 value from 0.5 to 6 which is above threshold at around
400 seconds. And, at around 500 seconds the attacker intentionally tries to open the inlet valve (2_MV_003) of
elevated reservoir tank. As a result water from the raw water tank will be pumped to the elevated reservoir tank.
Therefore, the attacker successfully achieves his goal by launching attack on 1_AIT_001 and 2_MV_003.
Fig. 14. Attack 5: Attack on 1_AIT_001
Similarly, attacks 6 is launched on the system to achieve his goals based on the attacker intentions.
5. Discussion
Next we summarize what we learned during this investigation and provide answers to research questions stated
earlier.
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Fig. 15. Attack 5: Attack on 2_MV_003
Value of a testbed: Researchers have studied [25, 26] the attacks on water distribution systems. However, these stud-
ies have concentrated on small systems with a few sensors and actuators, and thus are not adequate to investigate
cyber attacks on larger systems. Characterization of cyber attacks on water distribution systems [26] launched in a
simulated environment may not be realistic though they do offer hints on the design of experiments reported here.
The study reported here overcomes the limitations of past studies by using a realistic water distribution system as
the testbed, namely WADI.
RQ1: How do cyber attacks impact a water distribution system?:
Section 4.3 describes how six attacks affect the water distribution process in WADI. In summary, an attack may
lead to any one or more of the following undesirable consequences: (a) tank overflow, (b) pressure drop at the
consumer end, (c) no water at consumer end, and (d) equipment damage. In addition to the six attacks mentioned
in Section 4.3, several other attacks can be launched on WADI. For example organic and inorganic contaminants
may be added to water and the chemical sensors compromised [27] so that the attack is not detected. WADI also
has a leakage simulator that can be used to launch leakage or water theft attacks. Such attacks and their impact on
WADI will be study in the future.
RQ2: How does knowing the response of a CPS to one or more cyber attacks, help in designing an attack detection
mechanism?:
Traditional attack detection is often based on network traffic monitoring. [28] Proposed water marking schemes
are based on control theory. [29] It is well understood that cyber attacks or faults on the system affect specific
sensor readings.
Future research will focus on the detection of attacks such as those described in Section 4.1. There exist several
detection mechanisms in the literature. One such mechanism is based on invariants derived from plant design. A
“process invariant," or simply an invariant [30] is a mathematical relationship among “physical" and/or “chemical"
properties of the process controlled by the PLCs in a CPS. These invariants aid in detecting such attacks. For
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example, attack 1 in Section 4.1 can be detected as follows. In this attack, attacker sets the raw water tank level
to LL state and as a result 1_MV_001 opens to fill the tank. Further, the tank level is not rising even though the
inlet valve is open and also there is no outflow from this tank. One can write the invariant for the valve and the
tank level as follows. If the tank level is in LL and the inlet valve opens, then after sufficient time the tank level
should rise to L or H state. However, in this case the tank level neither reaches L nor the H state. Clearly, in this case
the invariant is violated and hence the attack is detected. Therefore, these kinds of invariants are useful in attack
detection. Note that violation of an invariant does not necessarily imply that there is a cyber attack; it could also
be due to communication or component failure.
6. Related Work
Open research challenges: Researchers have presented challenges in safety and security against cyber attacks that
need to be addressed while designing a CPS [31–33]. Sajid et al. [34] explained the integration of IoT and SCADA
systems with a focus on security and how to integrate and create intelligent ICS using the Internet. Humayed et
al. [35] surveyed literature on cyber physical systems security, and presented a orthogonal framework consists of
security, components, system perspectives. They focused mainly on four CPS systems such as ICS, smart grids,
medical devices, and smart cars.
Attack modeling and analysis: Attacks have been modeled as noise in sensor data [29]. Attack models designed
specifically for CPS include a variety of deception attacks including surge, bias, and geometric [36]. Such models
have been used in experiments to understand the effectiveness of statistical techniques in detecting cyber attacks.
The attacks designed in this work are based on a cyber-physical attacker model [23]. Jajodia et al. [37] proposed a
detailed procedure for modeling cyber systems using attack graphs. Such graphs model practical vulnerabilities in
distributed networked systems. Chen et al. [38] have proposed argument graphs as a means to capture the workflow
in a CPS. The graphs are intended to assess a system in the presence of an attacker. The graphs are formed based
on information in the workflow such as use case or state, physical system topology such as network type, and
an attacker model such as an order to interrupt, power supply, physical tampering, network connection, denial of
service, etc. Typed graphs [39] and Bayesian defense graphs [40] are a few other important contributions to the
modeling of cyber attacks.
Attacks on water systems: The first well known attack on water supply was Maroochy Shire [41] in 2000 in
Australia. Industrial Control Systems Cyber Response Team [6] has reported several attacks on water systems and
remedial actions to protect against these. Amin et al. [25, 42] studied attacks on water canal systems and presented
attack detection methods based on control, hydrodynamic models. However, this paper focuses on an ICS system
consisting of a few sensors and actuators. The formal approach [43, 44] is used to analyse the security of a water
treatment system. We aim at investigating the impact of attacks on a larger system such as WADI, which has more
than 100 sensors and actuators. Riccardo et al. [26] presented a modeling framework to characterize the cyber
physical attacks on water distribution systems. This framework consists of a few categories of attacks and EPANET
simulation models. The analysis is applied to C-Town network to show the usage of the framework. This work is
mostly performed in a simulation environment while the study reported here was performed on an operational
water distribution system [14]. This research is helpful to understand the differences between simulation based
attack investigation in water distribution systems, real time water distribution attacks. Section 5 addresses these
differences and advantages of the approach used in the current work.
Attack detection in water systems: Mitchel and Chen surveyed [45] intrusion detection techniques for CPS. They
presented existing works based on a classification tree. They also presented the advantages and limitations of
the techniques. The use of invariants for detecting attacks on CPS has been proposed and evaluated by several
researchers such as in [30, 46, 47]. In this work it is claimed that the use of controlled invariant sets in detecting
cyber attacks uses little information about the controller and hence is useful for a large range of control laws. Yuqi
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et. al. [48] proposed an approach for learning physical invariants that combine machine learning with ideas from
mutation testing. Data driven [49, 50] approaches for attack detection is studied on a water treatment system.
Security of cyber physical systems are also studied as decision games [51]. The BATADAL [52] is a battle of the
attack detection algorithms competition on water distribution symposioum. The goal of the battle was to compare
the different detection methods to detect cyber physical attacks. The BATADAL was conducted on a C-Town net-
work, a real-world, medium-sized water distribution system operated through Programmable Logic Controllers and
a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA). Total seven different teams participated in the BATADAL
and their effectiveness of was evaluated in terms of time-to-detection and classification accuracy. This emphasis
of dealing with real-life infrastructure and equipment for training and research is also seen in the development of
Capture the Flag style gamification of an ICS testbed platform [53, 54]. The activity described in this paper is not a
conventional competitive hackathon; as a combination of jam and hackathon, it emphasises hacking CPS platforms
as a means to integrate, demonstrate and explore lines of research.
7. Conclusions and Future work
This paper reports an investigation into the response of an operational water distribution plant to cyber attacks.
The outcome of the investigation points to the importance of testbeds in understanding stealthy and a varied set of
attacks and practical issues in operational water distribution plants. The case study also indicates that an attacker
will likely be able realize an intent when adequate resources are available and the required accessibility exists. The
work presented in this paper is a step towards realizing a safe and secure critical infrastructure.
Future work includes understanding more stealthy attacks and the implementation of a prototype defence mech-
anism in WADI. We plan to implement some of the attack detection mechanism mentioned in the related work
section and assess in a real time water distribution system.
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Appendix
Acronyms:
AI Analog Input
AIT Analyzer Indicator and Transmitter
AO Analog Output
AP Access Point
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
CPS Cyber-Physical System
CUSUM cumulative sum
DAQ Data acquisition
DB Data Base
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DCS Distributed Control System
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DI Digital Input
DLR Distributed Logic Router
DO Digital Output
DoS Denial of Service
FIT Flow Indicator and Transmitter
HMI Human Machine Interface
ICS Industrial Control System
LIT Level Indicator and Transmitter
LSTM Long short-term memory
MITM Man In The Middle
MV Motorized valve
NI-PSP National Instruments Publish Subscribe Protocol
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
RIO Remote Input Output
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
VI Virtual Instruments
WADI Water Distribution
